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NOTES
confronted in two years' time. The discrepancy between this
figure and 23,000 is apparent.
These statistics, of course, have no value in the study or solu-
tion of modern legislative or administrative problems. They
throw no light upon the real character of legislation, because
they do not differentiate statutes according to length or difficulty
of enforcement. Obviously they have nothing to do with the
drafting of statutes or with legislative procedure. In dealing
with such questions, which are in no sense quantitative, statistics
can give no aid. But the use of false statistics can create a great
deal of confusion and misplaced emphasis. Clearly both lawyers
and laymen have recently been guilty of much statistical mis-
representation.
RALPH F. FUCHS.
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION'S POWER WITH
REFERENCE TO STOCK ACQUISITIONS
The trend of modern industry towards combination and
monopoly and the persistent endeavor of Federal anti-trust
legislation to prohibit restraints of competition, give rise to an
increasingly confusing mass of laws. The confusion is in-
creased rather than diminished by strict judicial construction
limiting the final powers of the administrative bodies entrusted
with enforcement of the statutes.
The Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act
were intended to supplement existing legislation by arresting
monopolies in their incipiency.2 With this objective, the acts
created the Federal Trade Commission to secure the advantages
of administrative action by a body of experts and specifically
prohibited certain practices, many of which were within the
general scope of existing legislation. Section 7 of the Clayton
Act prohibits the acquisition by one corporation of the stock of
another where the result is "to substantially lessen compe-
tition." 3 Section 11 of the act authorizes the Commission to
proceed against violators of this provision, and to enforce its
'38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. secs. 12-27.
'Standard Fashion v. Magrane-Houston Co. (1921) 258 U. S. 346, 356.
"'No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indi-
rectly, the whole or any part of the stock or share capital of another cor-
poration engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may
be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock
is acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such
commerce in any section or community or tend to create a monopoly of any
line of commerce." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. sec. 18.
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orders through the courts.4 Each of these two sections raises a
separate problem, section 7 necessitating an interpretation of
the expression "substantial competition," and section 11 involv-
ing the finality of the Commission's findings. These questions
are not clearly distinguishable, for in determining the extent to
which the Commission's findings are conclusive the reviewing
court must necessarily determine the nature of the findings re-
quired by section 7. However, a discussion of the cases arising
under this section will be clarified by first considering the facts
which have been held to constitute a substantial lessening of
competition and later discussing the finality of the Commission's
findings.
That the Federal Supreme Court adopts a rule of interpreta-
tion of section 7 at variance with that employed by the Commis-
sion is shown in the most recent case on this question, Interna-
tional Shoe Company v. Federal Trade Commission.6 The Inter-
national Company, the largest of the country's shoe manu-
facturers, acquired the stock of one of the largest eastern con-
ceins, the W. H. McElwain Shoe Company. The McElwain
Company's specialty had been men's dress shoes, which it sold in
35 states, the largest volume of its sales being in the northeastern
states, and more particularly in the large cities. Its product
was marketed through jobbers except for a few sales to large
city retail stores. The International Company produced men's
dress shoes at the same price as those sold by the McElwain
Company and of slightly superior quality, though not so attrac-
tive in appearance. International's sales were largely in the
western and southern states, but covered the entire country and
were for the most part made directly to retail dealers, par-
ticularly in small cities and towns. The McElwain Company
was in a poor financial condition at the time of the purchase,
'This section vests authority to enforce compliance with section 7 and
other sections of the Clayton Act "in the Interstate Commerce Commission
where applicable to common carriers, in the Federal Reserve Board where
applicable to banks, and in the Federal Trade Commission where applicable
to all other character of commerce." Detailed provision is made for notice
and hearing, and content of the transcript the Commission is required to
keep. The Commission is empowered to issue an order "requiring such
person to cease and desist from such violation, and divest itself of the
stock held. . ." The Commission may apply to the Circuit Court of Appeals
for enforcement of its order, or the party required by the order to cease
and desist from a violation charged may obtain review by petitioning the
Circuit Court of Appeals to set aside the order. For provisions of this
section as to extent of judicial review see p. 58, below. 38 Stat. 734 (1914),
15 U. S. C. sec. 21.
'(1929) 50 S. Ct. 89, 74 L. Ed. 173. Justices Stone, Holmes and Brandeis
dissented. See note (1930) 24 ILL. L. REv. 908 and (1930) 39 YALE L. J.
1042.
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having contracted for purchases of large quantities of hides
just before a drop in the market price. The court held that
since the companies did not meet in the same market in respect
of 95 per cent of their sales and because the products varied in
quality and appearance, there was no competition in fact prior
to the acquisition, and hence no violation of section 7. The court
also stressed the so-called "rule of reason ' 6 in holding that the
McElwain's financial condition prevented the transaction from
being against the public interest, and thus negatived a violation
of the statute. This reason was not necessary to the decision
since the fact that no prior competition in fact existed was suffi-
cient reason for reversing the Federal Trade Commission, which
had found a violation of section 7 and had ordered the Inter-
national Shoe Company to divest itself of the stock of the Mc-
Elwain Company.7
The decision is not consistent with some of the prior cases on
the question of the existence of competition in fact. In the case
of Aluminum Company v. Federal Trade Commission8 a claim
somewhat analogous to that which the Supreme Court sup-
ported in the International Shoe Company case was made. Be-
cause of wartime conditions the demand for the product of both
companies was larger than the supply. The companies main-
tained that since their products were not offered to the same
buyers, no competition existed. The court dismissed this claim
without other reason than that the Commission found that com-
petition existed and that there was evidence to support this find-
ing. In the cases involving the Swift Packing Company and the
Western Meat Company it was held that the fact that one of
the companies to a transaction is a small concern, competing
with the other only in one locality, does not alone negative a
violation of the statute., And yet in Thatcher v. Federal Trade
' See infra note 22.
'In the Matter of International Shoe Company (1925) 9 F. T. C. 441.
(1922) 284 F. 401, certiorari denied (1923) 261 U. S. 616. In this
case one company acquired the stock of another through the guise of set-
ting up a third company and dissolving the competitor. The transaction
was held to be a stock acquisition within the meaning of section 7.
'Swift and Company v. Fed. Trade Com. (1925) 8 F. (2d) 595. One
corporation acquired the stock of two small companies whose output
amounted to only a fraction of one per cent of the total output of the
nation. The Circuit Court of Appeals held a violation of section 7 oc-
curred, stating, "Prior competition need not have been substantial nor the
effect of the acquisition injurious to the public, in the face of clear and
concise language of the statute condemning the acquisition unconditionally."
This case was reversed in the Supreme Court on the grounds that the Com-
mission acted too late in bringing its action, for the company had not only
acquired the stock but had absorbed the assets of the other firm. Thus
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Commission ° it was held that no competition in fact existed
where the two companies to the transaction were engaged pri-
marily in the manufacture of different products, and the com-
pany whose stock was acquired devoted less than one per cent of
its total output to the competing product.
The Western Meat Company. and Swift and Company cases
probably. represent the broadest construction of "substantial
lessening of competition," while the International Shoe Com-
pany case adopts the narrowest view. In none of the cases is
there an attempt to define the term with the purpose of laying
down a rule to be followed by the Commission, and since the
statute itself gives no indication of what is meant to be included
within the expression the Commission has no definite authority
upon which to proceed in the future.
The question of the finality of the Commission's findings is
dealt with at greater length in the statute. The reviewing court
is given power "to make and enter, on the pleadings, testimony,
and proceedings set forth in such transcript [of the Commis-
sion's record] a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside
the order of the Commission. The findings of the Commission
as to the facts, if supported by testimony, shall be conclusive."11
The apparent objective of definitely prescribing the scope of
judicial review in the statute has been far from successful, for
the stock of the company acquired was of no value and an order to divest
itself of this stock would be of no avail. The Commission must render its
order within a reasonable time after the transaction takes place.
Western Meat Company v. Fed. Trade Com. (1926) 272 U. S. 554. A
claim of lack of substantial competition prior to the acquisition was made.
The corporation whose stock was acquired was a small concern whose busi-
ness was largely confined to one state. The Supreme Court dismissed the
claim holding that there was evidence to support the Commission's finding
that a violation occurred.
(1925) 5 F. (2d) 615. One company acquired the stock of four cor-
porations engaged in the manufacture of bottles. The principal issue was
whether the transaction was a stock acquisition or an acquisition of the as-
sets of these companies. The Commission found that it was a stock
acquisition which substantially lessened competition. The Circuit Court
of Appeals sustained this decision as to three of the companies but held
that as to the fourth there was no violation because there was no prior
substantial competition. The Thatcher Company was engaged in the
manufacture of milk bottles, while the other company was engaged pri-
marily in the manufacture of whiskey bottles and produced only 8,000 gross
of milk bottles out of a total production of 1,000,000 gross. The decree
of the Circuit Court of Appeals was modified by the Supreme Court on
the same grounds as in the Swift and Co. case, supra note 9. The case is
reported along with the Swift and Co. and Western Meat Co. cases (1926)
272 U. S. 554.
Clayton Act, section 11. 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U. S. C. sec. 21.
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the cases present a variety of conflicting interpretations. The
first sentence of the above quotation seems to imply powers of
minute review of the whole proceeding in order to decide the
issues presented, without respect to the Commission's decision.
The extent of the limitation on review imposed by the state-
ment that the Commission's findings of facts are conclusive if
supported by testimony depends naturally on the interpretation
of the term "finding of fact." As in the interpretations of sec-
tion 7, the court has not enunciated a rule of interpretation
which has been followed with any degree of consistency.12
In the cases which have sustained the Commission the rule
which gives the greatest degree of finality to the Commission's
findings is laid down in Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific
Paper Association," "The weight to be given facts and circum-
stances admitted, as well as inferences reasonably to be drawn
from them is for the Commission." The question of what con-
stitutes a substantial lessening of competition is treated as -a
finding for the Commission and not as a conclusion of law, for
the court holds that the Commission's finding that competition
was substantially lessened "cannot be said to be without suffi-
cient support and therefore is conclusive on the court."
In other cases, however, courts have reviewed the evidence
and dismissed the case merely by stating that the facts found do
not constitute a violation of the statute. 14 These cases proceed
on the assumption that the ultimate question of what constitutes
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act is one of law for the
court, not the Commission, in direct conflict with the rule an-
nounced in the Pacific Paper Association case.
In the Curtis Publishing Company case' 5 the court did not hold
that the facts found by the Commission failed to support the
A good discussion of the difficulty of interpretation of the term "finding
of fact" as differentiated from a "conclusion of law" is contained in an
article by A. M. Tollefon, Judicial Review of the Decisions of the Federal
Trade Commission (1927) 4 Wis. L. REv. 257.
U (1927) 273 U. S. 52. The Commission's order in this case was made
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits
"unfair methods of competition." On the question of judicial review of
the Commission's orders, actions under this section present the same prob-
lem as in section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Fed. Trade Com. v. Kinney-Rome Co. (1921) 275 F. 665; Mennen Co.
v. Fed. Trade Com. (1923) 288 F. 774; Fed. Trade Com. v. Gratz (1920)
253 U. S. 421; Fed. Trade Com. v. Raymond Bros. Clark Co. (1922) 280
F. 529.
" Fed. Trade Com. v. Curtis Publishing Company (1923) 260 U. S. 568.
This case involved an alleged violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act
which renders unlawful a sale, or contract of sale, or a lease on the con-
dition that the purchaser or lessee shall not use the commodity of a com-
petitor where the effect of such lease or contract may be to substantially
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order, but refused to sustain the findings themselves. The rea-
sonable basis for this holding is that the findings which are not
sustained are in reality conclusions of law and that, under the
statute, the court is bound by the Commission's findings only
where they are findings of fact. Though the decision in the
Curtis Company case was probably based on this distinction, the
broad language of the majority opinion does not limit the court's
power to overrule findings to questions of law alone. The
principal issue in this case was whether certain contracts be-
tween the Curtis Company and its distributors were contracts
of sale and hence void as containing a condition restraining the
buyer from dealing in goods of a competitor, or whether they
w re contracts of agency and not within the statute. The Com-
mission found that they were contracts of sale and a violation of
section $ of the Clayton Act.'8 The Court of Appeals inquired
into the evidence and, disregarding the Commission's finding,
held that the contracts in issue were contracts of agency.17 The
Supreme Court sustained the Court of Appeals, justifying that
court's policy of making its own findings by stating, "Manifestly
the court must inquire whether the Commission's findings are
supported by the evidence. If so supported they are conclusive.
But as the statute grants jurisdiction to make and enter on the
pleadings, testimony, and proceedings a decree affirming, modi-
fying or setting aside an order, the court must also have power
to examine the whole record and ascertain for itself the issues
presented and whether there are material facts not reported by
the Commission. If there be substantial evidence relating to
such facts from which different conclusions may be drawn, the
matter may be and ordinarily, we think, should be remanded to
the Commission-the primary fact-finding body-with direc-
tions to make additional findings; but if from all the circum-
stances it clearly appears that in the interests of justice the
contest should be decided without further delay the court has
full power under the statute so to do." 18 The late Chief Justice
Taft rendered a doubting opinion in which he pointed out that
the above quotation was not entirely clear, saying: ". . . if
this means that where it clearly appears that there is no sub-
stantial evidence to support additional findings necessary to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
This section is enforceable by the Commission in the same manner as sec-
tion 7, so that the question of judicial review is the same in both sections.
"Fed. Trade Com. v. Curtis Publishing Co. (1919) 2 F. T. C. 20. For
the provisions of section 3 of the Clayton Act see supra note 15.
" Curtis Publishing Co. v. Fed. Trade Com. (1921) 270 F. 881.
Fed. Trade Com. v. Curtis Publishing Co. (1923) 260 U. S. 568, 580.
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justify the order of the Commission complained of, the court
need not remand the case for further proceedings, I fully con-
cur in it. It is because it may bear the construction that the
court has discretion to sum up the evidence pro and con on issues
undecided by the Commission and make itself the fact finding
body, that I venture with deference to question its wisdom and
correctness." '9
This statement from the majority opinion in the Curtis Com-
pany case is cited with approval in the International Shoe Com-
pany case. In the Curtis Company case there is some reason fo
believe that the court meant to limit its power of making find-
ings not reported on by the Commission to matters which were
open to only one conclusion from the evidence, and the Chief
Justice limited his approval to the statement so construed. In
the International Shoe Company case, it appears that the court
assumes the power which former Chief Justice Taft questioned,
for the court reviews the evidence and not only makes findings
on matters unreported by the Commission, but makes findings
directly opposed to those of the Commission. The court de-
cided that the facts did not constitute a violation of the Clayton
Act because: (1) there was no lessening of competition to
such a degree as injuriously to affect the public; (2) pre-exist-
ing competition is necessary to constitute a violation and there
is no pre-existing competition where (a) the bulk of the trade
of the two companies is in different sections of the country, (b)
there is a difference in appearance and quality of the two
products and a consequent appeal to different classes of people,
(c) in respect of 95 per cent of the business there is no compe-
tition in fact-no observed tendency to contest in the same
market for the trade of the same persons, (d) uncontradicted
testimony is given by officers of the companies to the effect that
competition was incidental and imperceptible; and (3) the pur-
chase by a corporation in need of additional facilities of the stock
of another corporation in failing circumstances, the rehabilita-
tion of which is doubtful, is not prejudicial to the public.
The Commission made findings on practically all of these mat-
ters.20 The court's first finding is merely a conclusion from the
other findings, even granting the proposition that the trans-
action must be such as injuriously to affect the public. On the
question of pre-existing competition the Commission found in
paragraph 5 of its report that the products "were similar in
style, comparable in price, and equal or superior in quality (to
the shoes produced by the McElwain Company)." Paragraph
2 states that the International Company sold to purchasers in
Ibid. 583.
" In the Matter of International Shoe Co. (1925) 9 F. T. C. 441.
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substantially all the states, and paragraph 3 qualifies this with
the statement that the sales were principally to dealers in small
towns. Paragraph 4 states that the McElwain Company sold
throughout the country.
The Supreme Court found that the McElwain Company was
in financial difficulties, its rehabilitation doubtful, and that the
purchase possibly saved it from bankruptcy or receivership.
Paragraph 9 of the Commission's report states that the Mc-
Elwain Company had suffered through a temporary drop in
prices in 1920 at a time when it had large supplies of hides
ordered and other contractual obligations to meet, and that it
owed large sums of money to the banks at the time of the
acquisition, but that the concern was not insolvent and did not
fail. It is pointed out in the dissenting opinion in the Supreme
Court that there was testimony to sustain the Commission's find-
ing that the company had value as a going concern in com-
petition.21
Thus the Supreme Court in effect weighed the evidence and
made its own findings. These findings were not all on matter
unreported by the Commission, but as shown above, some of
them were in direct conflict with the Commission's findings. In
making its own findings and in going into the evidence minutely,
weighing it, and deciding, for example, that the Commission
should have given more weight to the testimony of officers of the
companies to the effect that competition was imperceptible and
to the testimony in regard to the financial condition of the Mc-
Elwain Company, the court not only overruled findings of fact
made by the Commission, but summed up the evidence pro and
con and assumed the position of the fact-finding body.
The court's conclusion that no competition in fact existed is
subject to criticism in that it is arrived at through an assumption
of fact-finding powers which the statute vests solely in the Com-
mission. This conclusion is reached by the application of a sub-jective test much similar to that employed by the Commission,
Elementary findings are made from the evidence such as the
court's finding that the products varied in quality and appear-
ance and that the bulk of the sales of the two companies was to
different classes of people. From such findings inferences are
drawn, such as the court's inference that there was no observed
tendency to contest. As the final step the court draws its con-
clusion that no competition in fact existed. This conclusion was
sufficient basis for overruling the Commission but the court
makes the additional "finding" that there was no lessening of
competition to such a degree as injuriously to affect the pub-
lic. The unnecessary injection of the "rule of reason" not only
(1929) 50 S. Ct. 89, 94.
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complicates the issue of this case but adds to the confusion
prevalent under the Clayton Act generally. The rule was first
employed by the court under the Sherman Act. 22 One of the
objectives of the Clayton Act was to supplement this act with
prohibitions of practices not specifically condemned under prior
anti-trust legislation. Thus the application of the rule of rea-
son defeats the legislative attempt unconditionally to prohibit
these practices. 23 If the lessening of competition must be such
as injuriously to affect the public, then the interpretation of the
expression is entirely different from that employed by the Com-
mission. The Commission is equipped to apply interpretation
based on statistics of sales and business practice. There can be
no efficient action by the Commission on the vague and perplex-
ing question of public interest, for this question cannot be an-
swered solely on a consideration of all the facts, but must in-
clude a consideration of circumstances not within the provisions
of the statute. The statute declares the public interest so far as
the Commission is concerned and it is empowered to determine
only the fact of a violation and to base its order on such fact.
If the court adopts a construction which the Commission can-
not follow, the benefits of administrative action are lost. For
judicial review in this event amounts to a rehearing of the case
before the court.
The International Shoe Company case, through its application
of the doctrine that the transaction must be prejudicial to the
public to constitute a violation of the statute, and through its
exercise of unlimited power of review, not only usurps the Com-
mission's fact-finding power, but practically negatives the effect
of section 7. The case may be considered as expressing the judi-
cial view that sound policy requires the recognition of the in-
dustrial trend. So regarded it is a doubtful policy in the face of
the declared legislative view to the contrary.
THOMAS G. JEFFREY, '31.
THE JUVENILE COURT AS A POSSIBLE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE BODY
The possibility of dealing with juvenile delinquency and de-
pendency by administrative action may seem a far cry, but it is
" Standard Oil Co. v. United States (1911) 221 U. S. 1, 60, ". . . it was
intended that the standard of reason which had applied at the common law
and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by
the statute, was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of de-
termining whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought
about the wrong against which the statute provided."
" See Swift and Co. v. Fed. Trade Com., supra note 9.
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